The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms

In this paper, we investigate the political determinants of the cost of equity using a unique data set of 236 firms privatized between 1987 and 2006 in 38 countries. We find robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in government ownership. We also show that the cost of equity is significantly related to political orientation and the extent of government expropriation. Furthermore, we report a less pronounced effect of state ownership on the cost of equity in more populist governments and in more financially developed countries, in addition to a more pronounced effect of state ownership on the cost of equity when the risk of government expropriation is higher. Results from an event study examining the replacement of left‐wing governments by right‐wing governments suggest a lower cost of equity in more financially developed countries and a higher cost of equity in more autocratic countries and in countries with a high risk of government expropriation. Finally, we find that chief executive turnover is associated with a higher cost of equity in more autocratic countries.     

Markups and the Welfare Cost of Business Cycles: A Reappraisal

Gali, Gertler, and Lopez‐Salido (2007) recently show quantitatively that fluctuations in the efficiency of resource allocation do not generate sizable welfare costs. In their economy, which is distorted by monopolistic competition in the steady state, we show that they underestimate the welfare cost of these fluctuations by ignoring the negative effect of aggregate volatility on average consumption and leisure. As monopolistic suppliers, both firms and workers aim to preserve their expected markups; the interaction between aggregate fluctuations and price‐setting behavior results in average consumption and employment levels that are lower than their counterparts in the flexible‐price economy. This level effect increases the efficiency cost of business cycles. It is all the more sizable with the degree of inefficiency in the steady state, lower labor–supply elasticities, and when prices instead of wages are rigid.     

Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation

Evidence suggests that banks tend to lend a lot during booms and very little during recessions. We propose a simple explanation for this phenomenon. We show that instead of dampening productivity shocks, the banking sector tends to exacerbate them, leading to excessive fluctuations of bank credit, output, and asset prices. Our explanation relies on three ingredients that are characteristic of modern banks’ activities: moral hazard, high exposure to aggregate shocks, and the ease with which capital can be reallocated to its most productive use. At the competitive equilibrium, banks offer privately optimal contracts to their investors, but these contracts are not socially optimal: banks reallocate capital excessively upon aggregate shocks. This is because banks do not internalize the impact of their decisions on asset prices. We examine the efficacy of possible policy responses to these properties of credit markets, and derive a rationale for macroprudential regulation in the spirit of a Net Stable Funding Ratio.     

Ecological Intuition versus Economic “Reason”

This paper discusses the discount rate to be used in projects aimed at preserving the environment. The model has two different goods: one is the usual consumption good whose production may increase exponentially, and the other is an environmental good whose quality remains limited. The stylized world we describe is fully determined by four parameters, reflecting basic preferences, “ecological” and intergenerational concerns, and feasibility constraints. We define an ecological discount rate and examine its connections with the usual interest rate and the optimized growth rate. We discuss, in this simple world, different forms of the precautionary principle.     

IMPLEMENTING A PROFESSIONAL ON-CAMPUS WORK EXPERIENCE FOR CLOTHING AND TEXTILE STUDENTS

A Clothing and Textile course is described which provided a transition from classroom education to the world of work, improved students’ interpersonal skills and assisted in helping women students establish identities as professional people. In addition, the experience described demonstrates how concepts and skills from a large number of other courses are integrated when a specific real-life clothing problem must be solved. Through an on-campus experience, twenty-eight jackets for the Washington State University Men's Ski Team were designed and produced. Students were organized into a design team and a management team. The design team designed the jacket to meet the requirements of the ski team, made the the patterns, fitted the basic shells, reworked the pattern, wrote the assembly instructions and determined the most efficient layout. The management team investigated and purchased the materials and equipment needed, including a Babylock serger, determined jacket cost, organized and conducted meetings with the clients, and wrote the contract. All students participated in the construction of the jackets, a process organized as a factory assembly line. Students were enthusiastic about this practical opportunity to apply design and management principles and the chance to work with others towards a common goal. The approach used with this class is applicable to numerous functional clothing design problems.     

Audit Firm Portfolio Management Decisions

We examine client acceptance and client continuance decisions of a large audit firm to provide empirical evidence on the extent and nature of risk avoidance that the firm uses to purposefully manage its client portfolio. Our results support several key new inferences regarding audit firm portfolio management decisions. First, the results show that this firm is shedding the riskier clients in its portfolio, consistent with the risk avoidance theory of audit firm portfolio management. Second, the results show that the firm's newly accepted clients are less risky than its continuing clients. Although results of both the client continuance and client acceptance decisions imply a less risky portfolio emerging over time, there are greater differences in risk between continuing and discontinued clients than between continuing and newly accepted clients. Third, we find that audit risk factors are more important in audit firm portfolio management decisions than are financial risk factors. Finally, we find no evidence that audit pricing affects the client acceptance and continuance decisions of this firm, controlling for risk and other client characteristics.     

West African Insurgencies in Agrarian Perspective: Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone Compared

This paper examines agrarian issues in civil wars in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Attention is paid to two different ways in which lineage society evolved during the colonial and post‐colonial periods. The motivations of fighters are related to these different trajectories of agrarian social change. In Côte d’Ivoire youth militia fought to uphold a lineage‐based social order, but in Sierra Leone a comparable group of young fighters sought to overturn it. Large migrant populations on a forest frontier are an important factor in Côte d’Ivoire, while in Sierra Leone significance attaches to an excluded agrarian underclass. Not all African conflicts are ethnic conflicts; autochthony is shown to be a factor in one conflict and class in the other. Approaches to post‐war reconstruction based on undifferentiated notions of community should be resisted.     

POLITICAL PREDATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

We analyze a game between citizens and governments, whose type (benevolent or predatory) is unknown to the public. Opportunistic governments mix between predation and restraint. As long as restraint is observed, political expectations improve, people enter the modern sector, and the economy grows. Once there is predation, the reputation of the government is ruined and the economy collapses. If citizens are unable to overthrow this government, the collapse is durable. Otherwise, a new government is drawn and the economy can rebound. Consistent with stylized facts, equilibrium political and economic histories are random, unstable, and exhibit long-term divergence.